Summary
A fitness tracker advertises every 200 ms, whether or not anything is paired to it. Those advertisements carry a manufacturer-specific payload that includes a battery level, a firmware revision and a counter that is easy to correlate across address rotations. Nothing here needs authentication, pairing, or anything stronger than a ten-dollar dongle.
Background
BLE advertising is a broadcast. Any receiver in range can read every packet, and the privacy feature meant to stop tracking, a resolvable private address that rotates every 15 minutes, only protects the address field itself.
Method
I flashed an nRF52840 dongle with the sniffer firmware, captured on the three advertising channels in turn, and exported the result to a capture file for analysis. Walking away from the tracker and returning later gave me a clean set of address rotations to line up.
Findings
The payload keeps a monotonic counter in the clear. Matching counters across the two address epochs links the tracker’s old and new addresses with certainty, which defeats the point of rotating them in the first place.
Takeaways
Rotate everything that can be correlated, not just the address, and keep counters out of advertisements. For researchers: always look at the manufacturer data before assuming the address is the only identifier.