Summary
In a 5G standalone network the handset never sends its permanent identifier in the clear. It sends a concealed one, derived with the operator’s public key, which only the home network can open. A first capture against an open-source core confirms the change and shows where useful metadata remains.
Background
The concealed identifier is the headline privacy improvement in 5G. It does not hide everything: message timing, capability exchange and the network’s own behaviour can still tell a careful observer a good deal.
Method
I deployed Open5GS as the core, an srsRAN gNodeB on a software-defined radio, and a test handset with a provisioned SIM. Wireshark decoded the NAS messages from the core side so I could compare them with what an over-the-air observer sees.
Findings
Registration requests carried a SUCI that changed on every attempt, which breaks simple tracking by identifier. Capability fields and the timing of the exchange stayed stable enough to link repeat attachments from the same handset.
Takeaways
SUCI is a real improvement, but identity is more than one field. Test the whole registration, not just the identifier, when assessing what a network leaks.